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A Deposit Insurance Puzzle
Many economists believe that a fixed premium
rate deposit insurance system, such as that in the
U.s.,encourages banks to take excessive risks.
Under such a system a bank can attract insured
funds at a risk-free rate regardless of how risky
the bank's portfolio. As a result, a bank might
attempt to reduce capital and increase asset risk
to raise its expected return on capital. Such
behavior in turn would result in frequent bank
failures and deposit insurance payouts.
A major puzzle! however, is why these concerns
do not appear to have been justified during most
of the post-Depression era. With the exception
of recent years, bank failures have been infre-
quent and expenses incurred by the deposit
insurance system minimal since 1940. Below,
we argue that at least part of the answer lies in
changes in the pattern of the capital positions of
banks and bank holding companies and the
resulting unintended change in the nature of
capital regulation.
Capital regulation
As guarantor of a large portion of bank deposits,
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) has a strong interest in ensuring that
banks maintain adequate capital in order to limit
the exposure of the insurance fund to bank
losses and to limit banks' incentives to take
excessive risks. Pursuant to this interest, the
FDIC and the other banking regulatory agencies
influence bank capital through supervision and
regulation. In recent years, the agencies have
adopted minimum capital requirements that are
applied to all banks and bank holding com-
panies. However, more subjective capital
"requirements", based on the results of the reg-
ulatory agencies' examinations of individual
banking organizations, traditionally have been
part of the process of bank capital regulation.
Book and market values
Even though capital regulation takes the quality
of institutions' portfolios into account, the pro-
cess is criticized frequently for relying on histor-
ical, book-value accounting. Book-value
accounting can be misleading when the current
market values of assets and liabilities differ from
their historical values. Such differences can
result from, for example, changes in interest
rates, in the value of loan collateral, or in the
riskiness of unsecured loans.
Implicit in this criticism of capital regulation is
the assumption that book-value measures of
capital will tend to exceed market-value mea-
sures and, thereby, overstate the true current
capital position. This can be a serious problem
because the FDIC's net loss when a bank is
closed is determined by the current market value
of the bank's assets minus liabilities, and not by
what the bank shows on its books.
The book value of capital, however, need not
always be less than the market value. When the
market value of capital is rising, for example, the
book value generally will rise more slowly
because the turnover of book assets takes time.
Thus, for some period of time, a bookccapital
measure could understate true current capital.
Moreover, certain assets might not be captured
fully by accounting measures. One such item is
a bank's charter - a potentially valuable asset,
the current value of which would not be
revealed in book-value measures unless the
bank had been purchased recently.
Historical evidence
Chart 1 depicts the historical relationship
between the market and book values of the
aggregate capital-to-asset ratios (on a year-end
basis except for the third quarter of 1986) for the
25 largest bank holding companies as of 1985.
The market-based measure was derived by
dividing the market value of common equity by
an estimate of the market value of assets. The
market value of common equity is the number of
shares outstanding times the price per share, and
market assets were approximated by the sum of
the market value of equity and the book value of
liabilities. The book-value measure in the chart
is the ratio of the book value of common equity
divided by the book value of assets. It should beFRBSF
noted that this measure of common equity dif-
fers from the regulatory definition of primary
capital, most importantly, by excluding certain
loan loss reserves.
The chart reveals at least two important develop-
ments. One is that both market- and book-value
capital-to-asset ratios were much higher during
the 1950s and 1960s than in more recent years.
The change is particularly dramatic for the mar-
ket-based ratios, which fell from a high of over
12 percent in the early 1960s to below 4 percent
in the beginning of the 1980s.
The second development concerns the relation
of the book to the market value of capital. Over
most of the period considered, the market value
of capital actually exceeded the book value in
the aggregate. Not until the mid-1970s, follow-
ing sizable declines in bank stock prices, did the
combined market capital ratio for the sample of
large bank holding companies fall below the
book ratio. Moreover, from 1958 to 1972, over
95 percent of the banks in our sample had mar-
ket-value ratios that exceeded their book-value
measures. In contrast, from 1978 through 1985,
the percentage was only about 20, although it
had risen to 44 by the latter part of 1986.
A similar pattern holds for banking organizations
other than large bank holding companies. Data
on about 130 other publicly traded banking
organizations indicate that market values of
common equity generally exceeded book values
going into the 1970s but fell below book values
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. One dif-
ference between the patterns is that the market
capital ratios of the sample of 130 banking
organizations tended to increase much more
sharply in 1985 and 1986. (Unfortunately, com-
parable data are not available on the market
values of small, closely held banks.)
Significance
These changes in bank capital positions have
far-reaching implications for the protection
provided to the deposit insurance fund. First,
while a number of economic and regulatory fac-
tors affect FDIC losses, the relatively high levels
of market-based capital ratios in the 1950s and
1960s suggest that the deposit insurance system
should have been protected much better then.
Chart 2 shows this indeed was the case. Bank
failures and FDIC payouts relative to deposits
were minimal over that entire period.
Second, the higher market value of capital in
relation to book value in earlier years may have
had some bearing on the low FDIC expenses.
Since book values were less than market values
then, regulatory agencies using capital standards
tied to book values probably were less likely to
view a bank as adequately capitalized when it
was not.
Bankruptcy costs
In light of this last possibility, it is conceivable
that banks in the 1950s and 1960s had reason to
be concerned that regulators, focusing primarily
on book-value capital, might take action against
a bank with low book-value capital. Specifically,
they may have been concerned that regulators
might close such a bank even though its market
value was still positive (perhaps because of its
charter value). If regulators were to close a bank
under those circumstances, the owners' loss of
the positive market value of the bank would be
equivalent to what is known as a bankruptcy
cost.
Consideration of such bankruptcy costs may
have contributed to the stability of banking and
the minimal losses of the FDIC in the 1950s and
1960s. As several economists have shown, when
bankruptcy costs are important, firms will want
to avoid them by voluntarily holding enough
capital to ensure their solvency. Thus, if a clo-
sure policy that had the potential of imposing
bankruptcy costs were in force, it could explain
the high capital levels of banks in the 1950s and
1960s and the minimal losses of the FDIC.
What about now?
The picture has been quite different in the
1980s. Chart 2 shows sharp increases in bank
failures and in the expenses of the FDIC, starting
in 1982. Although these increases are often
directly linked to losses on, say, energy or agri-
cultural loans, the situation likely was made
worse by a deterioration in the market-based
capital positions of many banks.
For one thing, the lower level of capital simply
meant that banks had a smaller buffer for
absorbing losses. In addition, during most of the
1980s, the market ratio of the combined com-
mon equity to combined assets for our sample of
banks was below the book-value counterpart.
When the market value of capital is less than the
book value, it is more likely for regulators to















generally based on book values have in recent
years contributed to the incentive of banks to
hold as little capital as possible and to take on as
much asset risk as allowed. This contrasts with
the 1950s and 1960s when, by focusing on the
book value of capital, regulators may have
induced banks "voluntarily" to assume more
conservative risk postures.
A final complication is that the deposit insur-
ance subsidy is an asset for a bank that would be
reflected in the price of the bank's stock. Conse-
quently, book-value measures of capital, in
recent years, could be even more misleading
than the gap between the book and market
ratios in Chart 1 indicates.
position. Likewise, it is more likely for the losses
imposed on the insurance fund to be larger
when banks are closed on the basis of the book-
value level of their capital.
To make matters worse, a bank with a greater
potential to shift losses to the insurance system
has more of an incentive to increase asset risk
and thereby its chance of failure. It is possible,
then, that capital regulation and closure policy
Finally, the events of the 1950s and 1960s indi-
cate that the risk exposure of the deposit insur-
ance system can be limited when banks
maintain strong capital positions. Unfortunately,
some Current political winds are blowing in the
opposite direction. In particular, greater consid-
eration is being given to capital forbearance pol-
icies for banks and thrifts that would allow
certain institutions with deficient capital to
remain operating. Experience, however, seems
to tell us that this is exactly the type of action
that poses the gravest threat to stability in bank-
ing and to the viability of the deposit insurance
system.
Michael C. Keeley and FrederickT. Furlong
Conclusion
A large drop in the level of the market value of
bank capital ratios and a reversal in the relation-
ship of book-to-market-based measures of capi-
tal may partly explain the pattern of bank
failures and FDIC payouts over the past 30 years
or so. Since book-value capital has exceeded
market-based measures in recent years, reliance
on book-value measures in bank regulation may
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 206,474 - 23 4,476 2.2
Loans and Leases1 6 183,163 - 28 - 124 - 0.0
Commercial and Industrial 53,567 76 980 1.8
Real estate 68,695 203 2,098 3.1
Loans to Individuals 36,991 - 158 - 3,845 - 9.4
Leases 5,399 23 - 228 - 4.0
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 16,051 2 5,087 46.3
OtherSecurities2 7,260 3 - 487 - 6.2
Total Deposits 207,392 - 2,585 1,567 0.7
Demand Deposits 52,802 - 2,262 1,049 2.0
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 37,357 263 1,093 3.0
OtherTransaction Balances4 19,816 - 236 3,302 19.9
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 134,774 - 88 - 2,784 - 2.0
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 44,907 - 155 - 1,930 - 4.1
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 32,161 - 30 - 4,271 - 11.7
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 22,833 - 2,176 1,717 8.1
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)jDeficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading accountsecurities
3 Excludes U.S. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change